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Abstract
We compare certain bankruptcy rules in a bankruptcy model with an en-
dogenous estate on the basis of normative criteria. In particular, ve proper-
ties related to distributive concerns are analyzed: minimal rights rst, secure-
ment of initial investments, initial investments rst, reasonable lower bounds on
awards, and reasonable lower bounds on losses. The proportional rule receives
the strongest support from this normative analysis among the rules consid-
ered. We also observe that the performance of the proportional rule improves
in the family of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates compared to the
general set of bankruptcy problems. Our results complement those in Karago-
zoglu (2008) and provide a broader perspective to bankruptcy problems with
endogenous estates.
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1 Introduction
The bankruptcy problem was rst introduced formally by ONeill (1982). It can
simply be described as a situation in which there is a perfectly divisible estate to be
allocated to a nite number of agents, whose claims add up to an amount larger than
the estate.1 Mathematically, a bankruptcy problem can be represented by a nite
dimensional claims vector and an estate with a positive value. A bankruptcy rule is a
function that associates a division of the estate in every bankruptcy problem. Many
real life situations such as distributing a will to inheritants, liquidation of the assets
of a bankrupt company, rationing, taxation, and sharing the costs of a public facility
can be described using parsimonious bankruptcy models.
There are three di¤erent approaches to analyze bankruptcy problems: normative
(axiomatic), cooperative and noncooperative game theoretical.2 This paper falls into
the rst category, which aims to compare di¤erent rules by their properties. In recent
years, a growing number of papers, analyzing the distributive properties of bank-
ruptcy rules have appeared. For instance, Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) provide a
characterization of the Talmud rule on the basis of the securement property, which
proposes a lower bound on the awards that agents receive. Hougaard & Østerdal
(2005) show that among continuous and order preserving bankruptcy rules, the pro-
portional rule is the only one that preserves inequality in awards and losses. Yeh
(2006) provides three characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule based on
two "protective properties", i.e., sustainability and exemption. Bosmans & Lauwers
(2006) compare nine well-known bankruptcy rules on the basis of Lorenz domination.
Most recently, Thomson (2007) o¤ers criteria to compare bankruptcy rules on the
basis of Lorenz ranking.
In this paper, we analyze the distributive properties of three prominent bank-
ruptcy rules in the class of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates (BPEE).
This new class is introduced by Karagozoglu (2008) in which the value of the estate
depends on the value of claims, i.e., it is not exogenously given.
The analysis of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates is important since it
has a potential to o¤er policy implications to managers in companies and policymakers
in nancial markets. The reason is that many real life bankruptcy situations follow
a risky investment made by companies, nancial institutions, investors, shareholders
and/or stockholders. For instance, a company borrows money to nance a risky
investment project. The return rate that the company promises to lenders (e.g.,
investors, shareholders, or stockholders) determines lenders claims. The realized
return rate on total investment determines the estate that can be allocated to lenders.
Hence, the estate is not independent from claims and is endogenously determined by
lendersinvestment decisions. In this class of bankruptcy problems, bankruptcy rules
1This corresponds to Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the US bankruptcy law.
2For extensive surveys of the literature, the reader is referred to Moulin (2002) and Thomson
(2003; 2006).
2
normative performances might di¤er from their performances in the general class of
bankruptcy problems. Therefore, using the results obtained in the general class of
bankruptcy problems might lead to wrong policy advises in this class of bankruptcy
problems.
Due to its empirical appeal and importance for policymaking as mentioned above,
it is interesting to see how bankruptcy rules perform on the basis of distributive
properties in the class of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. In this paper,
we focus on three well-known bankruptcy rules: the proportional rule, the constrained
equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule.3 In particular, we look at ve
distributive properties: minimal rights rst, securement of initial investments, initial
investments rst, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable lower bounds
on losses.
Our results show that the proportional rule receives the strongest support from
this normative analysis among the rules considered. In particular, it satises se-
curement of initial investments, initial investments rst (although it still does not
satisfy minimal rights rst), and reasonable lower bounds on awards in the class of
bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. Moreover, it also satises reasonable
lower bounds on losses under a condition, which is not very restrictive from an em-
pirical point of view. All in all, we observe that the proportional rule becomes more
appealing from a normative perspective in the class of bankruptcy problems with en-
dogenous estates compared to the general class of bankruptcy problems. It satises
some properties in bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates (e.g., reasonable
lower bounds on awards and reasonable lower bounds on losses), which it does not
satisfy in the general class of bankruptcy problems. This improvement is mainly due
to the interdependence of claims and the estate (i.e., endogenous estate formation).
In the general class of bankruptcy problems, the estate can take any nonnegative
value. However, in the class of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates, given
the claims vector, there is only one value, which the estate can take. As a result,
certain values of the estate for which the proportional rule does not satisfy certain
properties are eliminated in this class of bankruptcy problems. Moreover, the pro-
portional rule is the only rule among the three rules considered here, which satises
two new properties introduced in the context of endogenous estate formation i.e.,
securement of initial investments and initial investments rst.
This paper contributes to the literature on bankruptcy problems and the propor-
tional rule in fair division problems. Its contribution to the normative literature on
bankruptcy problems is due to the analysis conducted in an empirically appealing
class of bankruptcy problems (i.e., bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates),
which might produce policy implications for lawmakers, companies and investor as-
sociations. In particular, in a liberal bankruptcy regime that enables companies and
investors to write their own bankruptcy procedures (see Hart, 2000), both parties
3In Section 4, we provide results on the Talmud rule, Piniles rule and the constrained egalitarian
rule, as well.
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can gain from the analysis conducted in this paper. On the other hand, it also con-
tributes to the literature on fair division problems with its main message supporting
the proportional rule. Within this literature, our paper is comparably much more re-
lated to the equity theory of Selten (1978) and the accountability principle of Konow
(2000). The equity theory emphasizes the relative value of inputs and outputs. Since
changes in the value of the estate does not a¤ect this value, equity theory favors
the use of the proportional solution in our context. Similarly, the accountability
principle implies that people should be held responsible for losses in proportion to
their initial inputs. The equity theory and the accountability principle are very rel-
evant in our context since inputs (initial investments) and the output (estate) can
be clearly identied. Both of these normative arguments support the proportional
rule in bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. The results of our analysis
strengthens these arguments with di¤erent normative justications (i.e., on the basis
of distributive properties).
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model
of bankruptcy with an endogenous estate and the rules employed in this paper. In
Section 3 and its subsections, we conduct a normative analysis on the model presented
in Section 2. Section 4 discusses certain extensions and real-life applications. Section
5 concludes with nal remarks.
2 Bankruptcy Problem with an Endogenous Es-
tate
Consider an economy in which a nite set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of agents has invested in a
venture capital company with a risky business project, which promised them a return
rate of 0 < r  1. The amount agent i invested in the company is denoted, for all
i 2 N , as wi  0. Without loss of generality, assume that w1  w2  :::  wn. Note
that (1+ r)wi constitutes agent is claim. The risky business project failed and could
only bring a return rate of rf such that 0  rf < r  1 in which case not all agents
claims can be honored.4 Since the project could only bring a return rate of rf , the
value of the estate to be divided among the agents is given by E = (1+ rf )
P
i2N wi.
Therefore, the sum of claims,
P
i2N ci = (1 + r)
P
i2N wi, is greater than the estate,
E = (1 + rf )
P
i2N wi. As the reader might notice, the endogeneity of the estate
stems from the fact that the sum of agentsinitial investments determine the size of
the estate, given rf . Below, we provide the denition of bankruptcy problems with
4As far as our parameter assumptions are concerned: Thomson Venture Economics VentureXpert
Database shows that between 1969 and 2003, there were negative average annual returns only in
four years and an average annual return more than 100% prevails only in one year. These gures,
at least partially, support our assumptions on r (i.e., r  1) and rf (i.e., rf  0). A justication for
the assumption, r > 0, is that people would not be willing to invest in a risky business, which o¤ers
them 0 return even in the case of success.
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endogenous estates.
Denition 1 (BPEE) A bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate is a pair
(C;E) 2 RN+  R+, where C is a claims vector with entries ci = (1 + r)wi for all
i 2 N and E = (1+ rf )
P
i2N wi is the estate. The class of bankruptcy problems with
endogenous estates is denoted by eB.
Recall that, in the general class of bankruptcy problems there is no relationship
between the claims and the estate. The estate can take any nonnegative value inde-
pendent of the claims. From this point onwards, the analysis will focus on the class
of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate, unless otherwise stated. The
general class of bankruptcy problems is denoted by B throughout the paper.
A bankruptcy rule is a mechanism that allocates the estate to agents given any
bankruptcy problem. Formally, a bankruptcy rule F is a function mapping each
bankruptcy problem (C;E) 2 eB into Rn+ such that for all i 2 N , Fi(C;E) 2 [0; ci]
and
P
i2N Fi(C;E) = E. Below, we dene the bankruptcy rules we analyze in this
paper.
The proportional rule dates back to Aristotle who considers it equivalent to justice.
The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally with respect to claims.
Denition 2 (Proportional Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, P (C;E)  pC, where p
is given by p = (E=
P
i2N ci) = (1 + rf )=(1 + r).
The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equal as possible taking
claims as upper bounds. Agents with smaller claims receive more under the con-
strained equal awards rule than what they would receive under the proportional rule.
Hence, loosely speaking, this rule favors agents with smaller claims.
Denition 3 (Constrained Equal Awards Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all
j 2 N , CEAj(C;E)  minfcj; ceag, where cea solves
P
i2N minfci; ceag = E.
The constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate (i.e., the total
loss due to bankruptcy) in an equal way (shares bounded below by zero). Agents with
bigger claims receive more under the constrained equal losses rule than what they
would receive under the proportional rule. Hence, loosely speaking, this rule favors
agents with bigger claims.
Denition 4 (Constrained Equal Losses Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all j 2
N , CELj(C;E)  maxf0; cj   celg, where cel solves
P
i2N maxf0; ci   celg = E.
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3 Normative Analysis
We proceed with the normative analysis of the proportional rule, the constrained
equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule on the basis of distributive
characteristics they possess. In particular, we consider ve distributive properties
which are: minimal rights rst, securement of initial investments, initial investments
rst, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable lower bounds losses.
3.1 Minimal Rights First
In bankruptcy problems, one can argue that each agent should be entitled to a certain
positive amount (which might be di¤erent across agents). Social conventions, common
sense entitlements, customs, or rules and regulations are some factors supporting this
policy concern. These amounts that should be granted to agents are sometimes
called minimal rights in the bankruptcy literature. The minimal rights property is
introduced by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987). The minimal right of agent i is equal
to the amount left after honoring all other agentsclaims if this amount is nonnegative
and equal to 0 if this amount is negative. Intuitively, agent is minimum right is that
part of the estate, which is not contested by other agents.
Denition 5 (Minimal Rights) The minimal right of agent i 2 N is mi(C;E) 
maxf0; E  Pj 6=i cjg.
The minimal rights rst property refers to the idea of rst granting agentstheir
minimal rights and then allocating the remaining estate to truncated claims. Based
on minimal rights, the minimal rights rst property was also introduced by Curiel,
Maschler, & Tijs (1987). A bankruptcy rule F satises minimal rights rst, if the
one-step allocation obtained by applying F is identical to the two-step allocation that
involves F in the second step. Below, we give the formal denition of the property.
In the denition, F (C;E) refers to the payo¤ vector under F and m(C;E) refers to
the minimal rights vector.
Denition 6 (Minimal Rights First) For all (C;E) 2 eB, rule F respects minimal
rights rst, if
F (C;E) = m(C;E) + F (C  m(C;E); E  Pi2N mi(C;E)).
The following proposition shows that the constrained equal losses rule satises the
minimal rights rst property in eB, as it satises this property in B. Curiel Maschler, &
Tijs (1987) show that the proportional rule and the constrained equal awards rule do
not satisfy the property in B. The following proposition shows that the proportional
rule and the constrained equal awards rule violate this property in eB, as well.
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Proposition 1 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then, CEL is the only rule among P , CEA, and
CEL that respects minimal rights rst.
Proof. (CEL) Note that eB  B. CEL satises the minimal rights rst property in
B (see Thomson, 2003). Hence, CEL satises the minimal rights rst property in eB,
as well.
To prove that neither P nor CEA satises the property, it is enough to nd one
counter example. Pick n = 2, w1 = 10, w2 = 100, r = 0:8 and rf = 0:2. This set of
parameters are employed for both P and CEA, below.
(P) The minimal rights of two agents are
m1(C;E) = maxf0; (1 + 0:2)(110)  (1 + 0:8)(100)g = 0, and
m2(C;E) = maxf0; (1 + 0:2)(110)  (1 + 0:8)(10)g = 114.
In the one-step procedure, P2((18; 180); 132) = 120, whereas in the two-step proce-
dure,
m2((18; 180); 132) + P2((18; 66); 18) = 114 + 14:14 = 128:14.
Hence, P does not satisfy the minimal rights rst property in eB.
(CEA) In the one-step procedure, CEA2(C;E) = 114, whereas in the two-step
procedure,
m2((18; 180); 132) + CEA2((18; 66); 18) = 114 + 9 = 123.
Hence, CEA does not satisfy the minimal rights rst property in eB.
These results in eB may not be very interesting per-se since there is no di¤erence
between the results in B and eB. However, they open a venue for two new distributive
properties we introduce in the following subsection.
3.2 Securement of Initial Investments and Initial Investments
First
As it can be noticed in the denition of minimal rights, they are determined by
making use of the claims vector and the value of the estate. The normative idea
behind the property is rst allocating the part of the estate, which is uncontested.
Loosely speaking, this denition of minimal rights favors agents with bigger claims.
Finding reasonable minimal rights is a normative issue in most cases. Fortunately,
in the bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates, we have a natural candidate:
one might consider that agentsinitial investments (i.e., wi) constitute their "minimal
rights" to be honored rst. Indeed, this is valid in certain real life instances (e.g.,
a bank paying depositorsmoney back in case of bankruptcy). Accordingly, for all
bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates, for all i 2 N , we take wi as a "minimal
right" of agent i. Below, we formulate the securement of initial investments property.
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Denition 7 (Securement of Initial Investments) For all (C;E) 2 eB, rule F
respects securement of initial investments, if for all i 2 N , Fi(C;E)  wi.
The following proposition shows that the proportional rule has an advantage over
the other rules as far as this property is concerned.
Proposition 2 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then, P is the only rule among P , CEA and CEL
that respects securement of initial investments.
Proof. (P) Since P pays (1+rf )wj to each agent j 2 N independent of n, P respects
securement of initial investments, which are wi under the assumption that rf  0.
To prove that neither CEA nor CEL satises the securement of initial investments
property, one counter example su¢ ces. Pick n = 2, w1 = 10, w2 = 100, r = 0:8, and
rf = 0:1. This set of parameters are employed for both CEA and CEL, below.
(CEA) CEA2((18; 180); 121) = 121=2 < 100 = w2. Hence, CEA does not satisfy
securement of initial investments.
(CEL) CEL1((18; 180); 121) = 0 < 10 = w1. Hence, CEL does not respect secure-
ment of initial investments.
One might wonder how these three rules perform under the new denition of
"minimal rights" as far as the minimal rights rst property is concerned. Below, we
dene the initial investments rst property, which is based on the minimal rights rst
property. The only di¤erence is that the initial investments rst property uses wi
for all i 2 N as minimal rights. W refers to the initial investments vector in the
denition below.
Denition 8 (Initial Investments First) For all (C;E) 2 eB, rule F respects ini-
tial investments rst, if
F (C;E) =W + F (C  W;E  Pi2N wi).
The following proposition shows that the proportional rule satises the initial
investments rst property in eB, whereas others do not.
Proposition 3 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then, P is the only rule among P , CEA and CEL
that respects initial investments rst.
Proof. (P) We know that P (C;E) = ((1 + rf )w1; (1 + rf )w2; :::; (1 + rf )wn).
The bankruptcy problem in the second step of the two-step procedure can be writ-
ten as ((rw1; rw2; :::; rwn); rf
P
i2N wi). Hence, P ((rw1; rw2; :::; rwn); rf
P
i2N wi) =
(rfw1; rfw2; :::; rfwn). Therefore,
P (C;E) =W + P (C  W;E  Pi2N wi),
8
which proves that P satises initial investments rst.
To prove that neither CEA nor CEL satises the initial investments rst, one
counter example su¢ ces. The set of parameters used in Proposition 2 are used for
CEA and CEL, below.
(CEA) Recall that, CEA2((18; 180); 121) = 121=2 < 20 = w2. The bankruptcy
problem in the second step of the two-step procedure can be written as
((rw1; rw2); rf
P2
i=1wi) = ((8; 80); 11):
Hence, CEA2((8; 80); 11) = 11=2. But,
121
2
= CEA2((18; 180); 121) 6= w2 + CEA2((8; 80); 11) = 211
2
,
which proves that CEA does not satisfy initial investments rst.
(CEL) Recall that, CEL1((18; 180); 121) = 0 < 10 = w1. The bankruptcy problem
in the second step of the two-step procedure can be written as
((rw1; rw2); rf
P2
i=1wi) = ((8; 80); 11):
Hence, CEL1((8; 80); 11) = 0. But,
0 = CEL1((18; 180); 121) 6= w1 + CEL1((8; 80); 11) = 10,
which proves that CEL does not satisfy initial investments rst.
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 show that securement of initial investments
and initial investments rst also support the widespread use of the proportional rule.
3.3 Reasonable Lower Bounds on Awards
Another property capturing a certain distributive aspect is reasonable lower bounds on
awards, which is introduced by Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004). The reasonable lower
bound on awards property appears in Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) as securement,
in Thomson (2006) as secured lower bound and in Bosmans & Lauwers (2007) with
the name used here. This property ensures that any agent with a claim less than or
equal to the value of the estate receives at least one nth of his claim independently of
othersclaims, where n is the number of agents involved in the bankruptcy problem.
Below, we provide the formal denition of the property.
Denition 9 (Reasonable Lower Bounds on Awards) For all (C;E) 2 eB, rule
F respects reasonable lower bounds on awards if for all j 2 N ,
Fj(C;E)  ( 1
n
)minfcj; Eg:
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Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) show that the proportional rule and the con-
strained equal losses rule do not satisfy the reasonable lower bounds on awards prop-
erty in B (see Propositions 1 and 3). The following proposition shows that there
is an improvement for the proportional rule in eB, but not for the constrained equal
losses rule. More precisely, the proportional rule satises the reasonable lower bounds
on awards property in eB. Obviously, the constrained equal awards rule continues to
satisfy the property.
Proposition 4 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then, CEA and P satisfy reasonable lower bounds
on awards, but CEL does not.
Proof. (CEA) Note that eB  B. CEA satises reasonable lower bounds on awards
in B (see Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2004). Hence, CEA satises reasonable lower
bounds on awards in eB.
(P) To show that P satises this property, we look at two subcases: (i) n = 1 and
(ii) n  2.
(i) If n = 1, since cj = (1 + r)wj > (1 + rf )wj = E, minfcj; Eg = E. Then, since
(1 + rf )wj  E = (1 + rf )wj, P trivially satises the reasonable lower bounds on
awards for n = 1.
(ii) If n  2, then we make use of the fact that P satises securement of initial
investments. Since P satises securement of initial investments, this implies for all
j 2 N , Pj(C;E)  wj. But since n  2 and r  1, wj  (1=n)minfcj; Eg. Hence, P
satises the reasonable lower bounds on awards for n  2.
(CEL) To prove that CEL does not satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards, one
counter example su¢ ces. Pick n = 2, w1 = 10, w2 = 100, r = 0:8 and rf = 0:1.
CEL1((18; 180); 121) = 0 < (1=2)minf18; 121g. Therefore, CEL does not satisfy
reasonable lower bounds on awards.
The reason for the fact that the proportional rule does not satisfy reasonable
lower bounds on awards in B but satises it in eB is the endogeneity of the estate in
the latter class of problems. In eB, given the claims vector, the value of the estate
is determined. Accordingly, there is no path of awards, but just a single vector of
awards. This rules out some values of the estate, for which the proportional rule
violates reasonable lower bounds on awards.
3.4 Reasonable Lower Bounds on Losses
This property is also introduced by Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) and similar to the
reasonable lower bounds on awards property, only with the di¤erence that it imposes
lower bounds on losses. It ensures that any agent with a claim less than or equal
to the total loss loses at least one nth of his claim independently of othersclaims,
where n is the number of agents involved in the bankruptcy problem. Hence, it is
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the dual of the reasonable lower bounds on awards property. In fact, it appears in
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) as securement* to denote the duality between two
properties. Below, we provide the formal denition of the property.
Denition 10 (Reasonable Lower Bounds on Losses) For all (C;E) 2 eB, rule
F respects reasonable lower bounds on losses if for all j 2 N ,
Fj(C;E)  cj   ( 1
n
)minfcj;
P
i2N ci   Eg. (1)
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2004) show that the proportional rule and the con-
strained equal awards rule do not satisfy the minimal rights rst property in B (see
Propositions 1 and 2). The following proposition shows that the proportional rule
satises reasonable lower bounds on losses under a mild condition in eB, but the con-
strained equal awards rule does not. Obviously, the constrained equal losses rule
continues to satisfy the property.
Proposition 5 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then, CEL satises reasonable lower bounds on
losses. Moreover, under the assumption 1=n  (r rf )=(1+r), P satises reasonable
lower bounds on losses but CEA does not.
The assumption 1=n  (r   rf )=(1 + r) guarantees that given the number of
agents, the di¤erence between the sum of claims and the estate is su¢ ciently large
(for all agents to lose a certain amount). Moreover, as the number of agents increases,
the condition becomes less restrictive. In particular, it is asymptotically non-binding
since as n approaches1, the left-hand side of the inequality approaches 0. Hence, the
assumption is easier to justify in bankruptcy problems that involve large number of
agents. Loosely speaking, this assumption ts in our venture capital company setup.
Proof. (CEL) Note that eB  B. CEL satises reasonable lower bounds on losses
in B (see Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2004; Thomson, 2006). Hence, CEL satises
reasonable lower bounds on losses in eB.
(P) First, we show that P satises reasonable lower bounds on losses. To show that,
we look at two subcases: (i) n = 1 and (ii) n  2.
(i) If n = 1, since cj = (1+r)wj > (r rf )wj = cj E,minfcj; cj Eg = (r rf )wj.
Then, since (r   rf )  (r   rf ), P trivially satises the property.
(ii) If n  2, then we have two possibilities: minfcj;
P
i2N ci   Eg is equal to
cj or
P
i2N ci   E. Assume that minfcj;
P
i2N ci   Eg = cj. This implies that
(1 + r)wj  (r   rf )
P
i2N wi. Hence, the right hand side of (1) can be written as
((n  1)=n)(1 + r)wj. By our assumption, we know that
1
n
 r   rf
1 + r
. (2)
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This implies
(1 + r)wj  ((n  1)=n)(1 + r)wj (3)
since by simplifying (3), we get (2).
If minfcj;
P
i2N ci Eg =
P
i2N ci E, the result is still valid since it is shown to
be valid for cj 
P
i2N ci E. Hence, P satises reasonable lower bounds on losses.
Now, we show that CEA does not satisfy this property. To show that one counter
example is su¢ cient.
(CEA) Pick n = 2, w1 = 10, w2 = 100, r = 1, and rf = 0. Note that these
parameters satisfy (2). CEA1((20; 200); 110) = 20. Thus, CEA1((20; 200); 110) =
20 > 10 = 20  (1=2)minf20; 110g. Hence, the result follows.
It is, again, apparent that the reason of deviation from the results in B is that the
lower bound of each agents loss indirectly depends on othersclaims in eB. Thats
also why we need a condition for the proportional rule to satisfy the reasonable lower
bounds on losses. Note that 1=n  (r  rf )=(1 + r) is both a necessary and su¢ cient
condition.
4 Discussion
Sequential Priority Rules: Sequential priority rules are frequently employed in
the liquidation processes of companies. This ranking mechanism dates back to early
Germanic systems and variant of it is used in almost all modern commercial soci-
eties today (see Knight, 1992). Nowadays, priority classes are dened on the basis of
seniority (e.g., founding stockholders or new stockholders), status of creditors (e.g.,
stockholder or bondholder) or status of claims (e.g., secured or unsecured) etc. The
American bankruptcy law is a frequently quoted example in which priority classes
are federal government (taxes), trustees (administrative expenses of the trustee) and
two kinds of creditors (secured and unsecured claims). Moulin (2000) characterizes
sequential priority rules with axioms such as consistency, composition up and com-
position down. As the reader might notice, the distributive properties employed in
this paper are based on claim levels. Since priorities in sequential priority rules are
exogenous and based on criteria di¤erent than sizes of the claims, this class of rules
do not satisfy any of the properties we employ here.
In real-life bankruptcy problems, policymakers have certain distributive concerns,
which are not solely based on the value of claims. It is apparent that the sequential
priority rules are used to take care of such distributive concerns. On the other hand,
the proportional rule is shown to satisfy desirable distributive properties and is closely
associated with justice since Aristotle. At this point, it is worth mentioning that
sequential priority rules employ proportional division within each priority class in
practice. This fact is, again, in line with our ndings in favor of the proportional rule
and can be interpreted as a compromise between the pure priority mechanism and
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the proportional division and an e¤ort to capture certain distributive properties that
are not capture by the priority structure.
Talmud Rule, Piniles Rule, and Constrained Egalitarian Rule: We do not
analyze all well-known bankruptcy rules in detail in this paper. For instance, the
Talmud rule, the Piniles rule and the constrained egalitarian rule are left out. The
major reason for leaving out these rules is the fact that there are no drastic changes
in results for these rules from B to eB and none of them satises the two properties
introduced in this paper.5 The proportional rule would get a normative support
stronger than any other rule even if we included these three rules in our analysis.
The table below summarizes the results for these three rules in B and eB.
T Pin CE
MRF +(+)  ( )  ( )
SII      
IIF      
RLOA  (+) +(+) +(+)
RLOL +(+)  ( )  ( )
Table 1: Properties and Rules in eB and B.6
MRF refers to minimal rights rst, SII to securement of initial investments, IIF to the initial
investments rst, RLOA to reasonable lower bounds on awards, and RLOL to reasonable lower
bounds on losses. Signs in parentheses show whether the rules satisfy MRF, RLOA, and RLOL in
B or not.
Other Distributive Properties: This paper does not include all the distributive
properties dened in the axiomatic literature. For instance, order preservation (in
awards and losses), equal treatment of equals, anonymity, midpoint property and
claims truncation invariance are not studied here. The reason for leaving out these
properties is the fact that there are no interesting di¤erences between the results in
B and eB. In particular, all three rules studied in this paper satisfy order preservation
(both in awards and losses), equal treatment of equals, and anonymity both in B andeB. The proportional rule satises the midpoint property both in B and eB, whereas
the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules fail to satisfy
it in neither class of bankruptcy problems. Claims truncation invariance is not an
appealing property in the bankruptcy context we consider (see Thomson, 2006).
5Note that under our parameter assumptions, the Talmud rule coincides with the constrained
equal losses rule in eB: That is why it satises RLOA in B, but not in eB.
6Proofs of the results summarized in this table are available upon request.
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5 Conclusion
The results in this paper show that the proportional rule, which is shown to have
a noncooperative support in Karagozoglu (2008) also receives a normative support
in bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. The table below summarizes the
ndings in this paper.
P CEA CEL
MRF  ( )  ( ) +(+)
SII +    
IIF +    
RLOA +( ) +(+)  ( )
RLOL +( )  ( ) +(+)
Table 2: Properties and Rules in eB and B.
MRF refers to minimal rights rst, SII to securement of initial investments, IIF to the initial
investments rst, RLOA to reasonable lower bounds on awards, and RLOL to reasonable lower
bounds on losses. Signs in parentheses show whether the rules satisfy MRF, RLOA, and RLOL in
B or not.  means that P satisfy the property under a mild assumption.
Minimal Rights First: The minimal rights rst property requires the allocation
obtained by the one-step application of a rule to be identical to the allocation ob-
tained by rst granting agentstheir minimal rights and applying the rule afterwards.
Minimal rights of agents are nonnegative amounts from the estate left to them un-
contested by other agents. We already know that only the constrained equal losses
rule satisfy this property among the three rules considered, in B. Our results in this
paper show that this does not change in eB.
This leads us to two new properties, which are similar to minimal rights and min-
imal rights rst. Here, we deviate from the previous axiomatic literature and dene
minimal rights di¤erently in our context. It is intuitive to consider agents initial
investments as their minimal rights in bankruptcy problems with an endogenous es-
tate. It also captures certain reality since, for instance, banks are only responsible for
paying agentsinitial deposits (i.e., without interest earnings) in case of bankruptcy.
Securement of Initial Investments and Initial Investments First: The securement
of initial investments property refers to the idea of granting each agent a certain
amount in case of bankruptcy. The proportional rule is the only one among the rules
analyzed here satisfying securement of initial investments. Moreover, it is the only
rule among the three satisfying the initial investments rst property. Hence, if the
borrower (or the authority, who is responsible for the allocation of the estate) rst
wants to give agents their initial investments and then allocate the rest of the estate,
this procedure will give the same allocation with the one-step allocation, if he uses
the proportional rule.
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Reasonable Lower Bounds on Awards: The reasonable lower bounds on awards
property has a similar intuition as securement of initial investments. It requires
bankruptcy rules to guarantee a certain payment to each agent depending on the
value of their claims, the number of agents and the value of the estate. Hence, instead
of a xed minimal right that is valid for every agent, this property guarantees a lower
bound on awards possibly di¤erent for each agent. The constrained equal awards rule
satises the property in B (see, Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2004; Thomson, 2006; and
Bosmans & Lauwers, 2007). Hence, our result on the constrained equal awards rule
follows from these general results. What di¤ers from the general results is that the
proportional rule satises reasonable lower bounds on awards in eB.
Reasonable Lower Bounds on Losses: The reasonable lower bounds on losses prop-
erty is the dual of reasonable lower bounds on awards. It requires the loss of each
agent to be greater than a certain amount, which depends on the agents claim, the
number of agents and the value of the estate. By duality, we know that the con-
strained equal losses rule satises reasonable lower bounds on losses in B. Hence, our
result on the constrained equal losses rule follows from this more general result. What
di¤ers from the general results is that the proportional rule satises reasonable lower
bounds on losses in eB under a mild condition, which relates the number of agents
to the total loss due to bankruptcy. This condition is not a very restrictive one if
the number of agents involved in the bankruptcy problem is large, which is valid for
venture capital companies, for instance.
To conclude, the proportional rule receives a stronger support compared to the
constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule in the normative
analyses we conducted in eB. Results obtained in this paper complement the ndings
in Karagozoglu (2008) and provide a more complete picture for bankruptcy problems
with an endogenous estate. We can deduce that the proportional rule has an advan-
tage over other rules considered in eB, due to its improved performance in satisfying
desirable distributive properties as well as the noncooperative support provided for
it in Karagozoglu (2008). The di¤erence in the performance of the proportional rule
also makes it clear that lawmakers should not rely on results in the general class of
bankruptcy problems if the estate formation process is endogenous. Moreover, our
results gain a special importance in the light of recent suggestions in favor of a more
liberal bankruptcy regime, which would enable companies and investors to write their
own bankruptcy procedures (see Hart, 2000). In such a liberal system, these parties
would benet greatly from the knowledge on distributive characteristics of di¤erent
bankruptcy procedures, some of which is provided in this paper.
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Appendix
Denitions of Rules Mentioned in Section 4:
Denition 11 (Talmud Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all j 2 N ,
Tj(C;E) 

minf cj
2
; tg if E 
P
i2N
ci
2
cj  minf cj2 ; tg otherwise
where t solves
P
i2N Ti(C;E) = E.
Denition 12 (Piniles Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all j 2 N ,
Pinj(C;E) 

minf cj
2
; ping if E 
P
i2N
ci
2
cj
2
+minf cj
2
; ping otherwise
where pin solves
P
i2N Pini(C;E) = E.
Denition 13 (Constrained Egalitarian Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all j 2
N ,
CEj(C;E) 

minf cj
2
; ceg if E 
P
i2N
ci
2
maxf cj
2
;minfcj; cegg otherwise
where ce solves
P
i2N CEi(C;E) = E.
Denition 14 (Sequential Priority Rule Relative to Order ; Moulin, 2000)
Assume that  is a complete, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation on N .
(1) = i means "agent i has the highest priority in N ," (2) = j means "agent j has
the highest priority in N" and so on. Then, for all (C;E) 2 eB, and all i; j 2 N ,
fSPRj (C;E) > 0 and  1(i) <  1(j)g ) fSPRi (C;E) = cig
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